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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
(representative by each of managerial, institutional ownership, board independence and board 
meeting) and going concern evaluation among Jordanian listed firms. Through using multiple 
regression analysis, the results of this study illustrates that there is a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership, board independence and board meeting and going-concern 
evaluation, while a negative relationship is found with institutional ownership. There are four 
main hypotheses, two of them which are managerial and institutional ownership are accepted, 
while board independence and board meeting are not supported. This study shed more light 
on the importance of complying with the requirements of governance code and instructions 
by the companies and the need to impose fines or sanctions on non-compliant companies. 
The results of this study contribute to the creditors‟ interest to be more alert to companies 
which may possess characteristics that contribute in manipulation of future companies. 
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1.  Introduction  
Going concern is  defined  traditionally as “an entity the  is ordinarily viewed as 
continuing in business for the foreseeable future with neither the intention nor the necessity 
of liquidation, ceasing trading or seeking protection from creditors pursuant to laws or 
regulations” (Malaysian International Accounting, 2008). When the company faces any 
financial difficulties such as inability to fulfil its commitments and suffers losses, the external 
auditors‟ role becomes high importance in evaluating the ability of the company to continue. 
This will protect the interests of the financial statement users and help them to make their 
investments decisions. Ultimately, this could also protect the social and economic stability in 
Jordan. Furthermore, if the accountant does not provide the needed information, to the 
external auditor, definitely he will be unable to evaluate the companies‟ going concern and 
may not give the right decision to the investors.  
According to the Companies Control Department (CCD) in Jordan, the statistics showed that 
from 2000 to 2011, there were 44 bankruptcy cases among Jordanian companies, where 26 
companies (59%) were from the industrial sector, 15 companies (34%) from services sector 
and 3 companies (7%) from the financial sector (http://www.ccd.gov.jo/2012). Globally, such 
bankruptcy cases which were attributed amongst other factors to the weak of governance 
practices (Iskandar, Rahmat, Noor, Saleh& Ali, 2011). 
In order to avoid any manipulation case in financial statements, the Jordanian government has 
issued a set of regulations and laws such as corporate governance code to insure the 
credibility of financial statements. Accordingly, the companies listed at Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE) should form boards and committees to be committed with the requirements 
of corporate governance code. In 2002, the Securities Law in Jordan forced the public 
companies to apply corporate governance rules to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of financial statements. After the financial crises in 2008, the Jordan Securities 
Commission has issued a revised code of Corporate Governance for listed firmson ASE in 
order to determine the responsibilities and duties of boards and committees in public 
companies. 
The separation between managers and shareholders of firms leads to conflicts of interests. 
This isbecause the corporate managers control firms‟ assets effectively but in general they do 
not have a large number of the shares in their firms (Berle& Means, 1932; Jensen &Meckling, 
1976). Due to these conflicts, major companies such as Enron and WorldCom have collapsed 
(Habash, 2010). Such conflicts cannot be completely resolved bycontracts becauseit is costly 
and difficult to write and impose complete contracts (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995). 
Thus, under the incomplete contracts‟ world, mechanisms of corporate governance have 
arisen to limit such conflicts and to assist the firm to protect their investments to ensure 
continuity. Mechanisms of Corporate governance (such as ownership structure, board of 
directors etc) vary in terms of the costs and benefits. In this study, the collection of 
governance mechanisms is collected to assist the firms in their continuity by limiting the 
conflicts between corporate managers and shareholders. Such mechanisms are likely to vary 
across firms systematically because such costs and benefits are more likely to differ based on 
attributes of firm (Leftwich, Watts & Zimmerman, 1981; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Boone, 
Field, Karpoff, & Rahega, 2006; Watts, 2006).  
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
This study shows through this section the previous relevant studies and also develops also the 
research hypotheses. Four main hypotheses test the relationship between managerial and 
institutional ownership and board independence and board meeting with going concern 
evaluation. These relationships are shown below: 
2.1 The association between managerial and institutional ownership and going concern 
evaluation. 
Past studies on the effects of management ownership on the firm performance have shown 
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inconsistent results. For example, Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, & Nemec (2004) found 
non-linear relationship for companies involving initial public offerings in Thailand. They 
observe positive significant associationamong managerial ownership and earnings before 
interest and tax when the ownership is low or high. They also found negative 
associationamong managerial ownership and firm performance. Parker, Peters & Turetsky, 
2005) suggested that equity ownership by the management and external mechanisms 
respectively improve the company‟s financial performance. 
In contrast, previous studies also showed that management equity ownership has a significant 
positive relationship with firm value and agency cost (Iskandar et al., 2011). Other study 
reports non-linear relationships whereby at a certain level of management ownership reduces 
agency costs but at another level, it increases the agency costs (Davidson et al., 2004). Based 
on the agency theory, it is expected that management equity ownership has a significant 
negative relationship with going concern problem. When a manager becomes part of the 
company owners, they will have the same amount of incentive as that of the owner. Such a 
manager will not take risks that will not benefit them. It is therefore expected that the higher 
the level of management ownership in the company, the lower is the level of conflict of 
interest. This would in turn increase the performance of the company and avoid companies 
from facing going concern (Gul, Atalay & Hanninen, 2003).  
Parker et al (2005) found that managerial ownership is inversely associated with repeated 
going concern modifications. Iskandar et al (2011) also found that the management equity 
ownership has a negative significant relationship with going concern. Thus, these findings 
support the agency theory which argues that the best practice of corporate governance helps 
companies avoid financial and operational problems. Thus, the first research hypothesis is 
suggested as follows: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and going concern 
evaluation. 
As for institutional ownership, earlier findings were consistent with Bhattacharya and 
Graham (2007) in the contention that institutional ownership stakes negatively impact 
performance. They also revealed that firm performance does not influence pressure-resistant 
institutional ownership stakes; a result consistent with other studies in literature such as 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Thomsen, Betke, Glahn and Piper (2006), which 
contended that ownership decisions do not vary with firm performance. 
Clay (2001) and Iskandar et al. (2011) found a positive impact of institutional investment 
where institutional investors are able to act more effectively to the management compared to 
individual investors. Institutional investors have more incentives to monitor the management 
because the value of their investments is larger. Ahmad (2008) also showed that the 
institutional investors have more expertise to implement the monitoring responsibility at the 
lower costs (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991).  
In the relationship between institutional ownership and going-concern, to the knowledge of 
the researcher, there is lack of studies that are carried out in this context (Iskandar et al., 
2011). Parker, Peters and Turetsky (2005) examined such relationship and their results 
suggest that equity ownerships by the management and institutional investors from internal 
and external mechanisms respectively to improve the company‟s financial performance. 
Iskandar et al. (2011) found that the institutional investor equity ownership respectively has 
negative significant relationships with going concern. These findings support the agency 
theory which argues that the best practice of corporate governance helps companies avoid 
financial and operational problems. In the meantime, institutional investors become as 
external monitors other than the auditors. 
Based on the agency theory and the results that discussed above, it is predicted that there is a 
negative relationamonginstitutional ownership and going concern evaluation. Thus, this study 
presents the second hypothesis as follows: 
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H2: There is a negative relationship between the institutional ownership and going concern 
evaluation. 
 
2.2 The association between board independence and meeting and going concern 
evaluation 
Independence of board of directors and equity ownership have been widely researched in the 
context of company performance in many of developed countries such as U.S, U.K, Australia, 
Canada and Belgium (Iskandar et al., 2011). Independence of board members is often 
referred in terms of independence members of board of directors and its leadership structure. 
However, results of the studies have been inconsistent. For instant, independence of board of 
directors is often associated with the composition of non-executive directors which is also 
referred to as external directors. Previous studies in this area have shown mixed results. Some 
studies show positive relationships between the existence of external directors and the 
company‟s performance (e.g. Alexander, Veerle & Hubert, 2001; Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001) 
while others show no such significant relationships (Fosberg, 1998; Iskandar et al., 2011). In 
contrast, Parker, Peters and Turetsky (2005) found that board independence is inversely 
associated with going concern modifications. 
The study provides evidence that independent external directors have better ability to monitor 
and control the management relating to specific contexts such as company takeover, financial 
performance and financial reporting (Iskandar et al., 2011). The appointment of independent 
board members is the main criteria to make sure that the effectiveness of the boards. Boards 
of directors with independent external directors as members would be able to avoid any 
conflict of interest and to monitor the management effectively (Abdullah, 2001). Perry and 
Shiv (2005) finds that boards comprised of outsiders are more likely to make proactive efforts 
intended to curb downward performance trends. 
Parng and Fu (2011) detected firms with going-concern risk is precisely critical to all 
financial professionals. Based on the above argument, it is assumed that the existence of 
independent directors has a positive influence on the company performance in reducing the 
company going concern (Iskandar et al., 2011). Therefore, this study suggests the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the board independence and going concern 
evaluation. 
Regarding to the board meeting, boards of directors that frequently have meetings are more 
likely to conduct their responsibilities according to the interests of their shareholders, because 
ample time can be more dedicated to control and monitor issues such as conflicts of interest, 
monitoring management and earnings management. In addition, those that have fewer 
meetings do not have time to examine complex issues and spend their time in managing plans 
(Abed, Al-Attar, & Suwaidan, 2012). To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, only few 
studies were dedicate to the effect of board meeting frequency on going concern. Based on 
Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) findings, a board that does not meet frequently only has 
time to sign off management plans and conduct presentations and hence the directors may not 
have enough time to dedicate on corporate issues like earnings‟manipulation. The sample of 
their study was 282 firm and they concluded that managing the earnings is significantly and 
negatively affects the frequency of board meeting. In a related study, Chen, Miller, Francis, 
and Russell (2011) demonstrated that board meeting does not moderate the negative impact 
of concentrated owners on the performance of the firm. 
Xie et al. (2003) found a negative and significant association amongearnings management 
and the number of board meetings. Conversely, Uzun, Szewczyk, and Varma (2004) found 
that there are no differences in the frequency of board meeting among firms that practiced 
fraud and other healthy firms. 
Holistically, board meetings are deemed as an indication for boards‟ diligence. Many 
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previous researches have assessed the effects of board meetings by taking into account the 
number of meetings or regularity (Vafeas, 1999; Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 
2000; Carcello, Hermanson & Neal, 2002). This study employs the same method and 
techniques to gauge the yearly number for board meetings. Thus, this study presents the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between board meeting and going concern evaluation. 
 
3.  Methodology  
3.1 Research Sample and Data 
This study uses only industry and service sector for companies listed on ASE. This is because 
there are more companies suffered from bankruptcy in these sectors. There were 44 
bankruptcy cases among Jordanian companies from 2000 to 2011. 26 companies (59%) were 
from the industrial sector, 15 companies (34%) from services sector and only 3 companies 
(7%) from the financial sector (http://www.ccd.gov.jo/2012). This study uses data for year 
2011. The final sample was 113 firms. Companies in the financial sector were excluded 
because they have different Code of Corporate Governance issued by the Insurance 
Commission and Central Bank of Jordan (Al-Akra, Ali & Marashdeh, 2009). Thus, the 
industrial and services sector are more suitable to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and going concern evaluation in Jordan. 
3.2 Variables and Measurements 
Managerial Ownership: managerial ownership was calculated by dividing the total number of 
firm's shares owned by the board members and top management on the total number of firm's 
shares (Habbash, 2010). 
Institutional Ownership: institutional ownership was calculated by dividing the number of 
shares owned by institutions to total number of firm‟s shares (Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed & 
Alexander, 2010). 
Board Independence: board independence was measured by the percentage of non-executive 
directors to total board members (Habbash, 2010). 
Board Meeting: board meeting is calculated as the total number of board meetings held in a 
year (Habbash, 2010).  
Going Concern: Altman Model (1968) is adopted to evaluate the going concern of firms 
which is deemed as one of the financial ratio that have high accuracy level reached to 90% in 
evaluating the going-concern of firms. Hence, this study employs five of Altman‟s ratios to 
determine the Z score; 
 
Where 
Z score =  Firms‟ financial condition  (strong, moderate and weak) 
WC/TA =  Working capital ÷ total asset 
RE/TA =  Retained earnings ÷ total asset 
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EBIT/TA =  Earnings before interest and tax ÷ total asset 
MV/TA =  Market value of share ÷ book value of debt 
SA/TA =  Sales ÷ total asset 
Based on the percentage of Z score, Altman has dividedthe companies into strong, moderate 
and weak. In detail, strong level if Z rate is > 2.99, moderate level when Z rate is between 
1.811 and 2.98, while the weak level when Z rate is < 1.811. Therefore, this study uses the 
following regression model to examine the relationship between managerial and institutional 




Z Score =  Firms‟ financial condition  (strong, moderate and weak) 
MANOW = Managerial ownership was calculated by the percentage of shares 
held by directors on the board to the total number of firm's shares. 
INSTOW = Institutional ownership measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of shares owned by institutional investors. 
BIND = Board independence was measured by the percentage of non 
executive directors on the board to the total number of board members. 
BMEET = Board meeting refers to the number of board meetings held annually 
by the board of directors. 
4.  Finding 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
As presented in Table 1, the mean value of going concern is 73.19%. This ratio refers to 
almost 73% of Jordanian firms received audit report with going concern. The mean value of 
managerial ownership is 48.7%, whereas the minimum value is 11%. This refers that 43.2% 
of Jordanian listed firms are owned by managers. The average value of institutional 
ownership is 79.47%. This finding is higher than the result of Al-Najjar (2008) who showed 
an average value of institutional ownership among Jordanian listed firms at 68%. This means 
that the Jordanian firms have followed to the privatisation system that was launched during 
King Abdullah's reign in 2000 as an important step in economic reform system (ASE, 2009).  
The results also show that the mean value of board independence was 66.24%, whereas the 
minimum and maximum values were 25% and 94% respectively. This results show that the 
Jordanian listed firms have complied with the requirements of Corporate Governance Code 
(2009) which stated that the majority of board members should be independent. The result 
also shows that the average for board meeting is almost 6 meetings, whereas the minimum 
and maximum values were 2 and 14 meetings respectively. This result means that the 
Jordanian listed firms have complied with the requirements of Corporate Governance Code 
which stated that the board meeting should be at least 4 per year. This result indicates also 
that the boards of directors‟ meets dramatically and frequently which suggests that they 
Journal of Public Administration and Governance 
ISSN 2161-7104 
2014, Vol. 4, No. 4 
www.macrothink.org/jpag 106 
addresses the important issues in their companies. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
MAN 113 .11 .80 .4870 .16184 
INST 113 .40 .93 .7947 .13865 
BIND 113 .25 .94 .6624 .14375 
BMEE
T 
113 2.00 14.00 6.6372 2.52156 
GC 113 -2.97 3.36 .7319 .94652 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Based on the Pearson Correlation Matrix, there is apositive coeefecient between going 
concern and each of managerial ownership, board independence and audit committee, while a 
negative coefficent with institutional ownership.  
Managerial ownership has a positive coefficient with institutional ownership and board 
independence, while a negative relationship with board meeting. As for institutional 
ownership, this study finds a negative relationship between institutional ownership with both 
of board independence and board meeting. Regarding to the board independence, Table 2 
shows that there is a negative relationship with board meeting. 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 MAN INST BIND BMEET GC 
MANOW 1     
INSTOW .064 1    
BIND .071 -.081 1   
BMEET -.038 -.061 -.201
*
 1  
GC .151 -.139 .304
**
 .151 1 
4.3 Hypotheses Testing 
The data analyses of research model are based on regression analysis. Thus, before regression 
analyses were conducted, the assumptions of multiple regression analyses for research model 
were checked for all the variables. The assumptions are outliers, normality, linearity, 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticity (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 
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2010). The results show that there is no violation of these assumptions. 
Four main hypotheses were developed andoffered in previous sections. Table 3 shows the 
results of multiple regression analysis. Table 3 illustrates that the research model is 
significant (F= 5.502, Sig F = 0.00). The research model also explained 13.9% of the going 
concern variation (Adjusted R
2
= .139). 
For the first hypothesis, Table 3 shows that the result is not consistent with our expectation; 
the direction of the relationship between managerial ownership and going concern evaluation 
is positive but not significant (T = 1.618, P= .109). The result is supported by the result of 
Mueller and Spitz (2002) who found that a managerial ownership has a positive influence on 
ﬁrm performance. Hence, the hypothesis H1 is not supported. 
For the second hypothesis (H2), Table 3 shows that the direction of the relationship between 
institutional ownership and going concern is negative and not significant (T= -1.223, P=.224). 
This result is not consistent with our expectation. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is not supported. 
This study expected a positive association between board independence and going concern. 
However, the direction of the relationship between board independence and going concern is 
positive and significant (T= 3.647, P = .000) as shown in Table 3. This result is consistent 
with our prediction. Thus, hypothesis H3 is accepted. 
Regarding to therelationship between board meeting and going concern, Table 3 shows that 
there is a positive and significantrelationship between board meeting and going concern (T= 
2.406, P =.018). This result is supported by the result of Greco (2011) who concluded that the 
board effectiveness is related to the frequency of board meetings. Accordingly, this study 
accepts hypothesis H4. 
Table 3: OLS Regression Results 
Variable B Std. Error Beta T P value 
 MAN .834 .516 .143 1.618 .109 
INST -.739 .604 -.108 -1.223 .224 
BIND 2.165 .594  .329 3.647 .000 
BMEET .081 .034 .216 2.406 .018 
DV    Going Concern     
R2   = 0.169       
Adj 
R2  
 = 0.139 
F 
value  
 = 5.502         
Sig   =.000        
N  = 113 
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5.  Conclusion 
Through reviewing the literature of going concern, and to the best of researchers‟ knowledge, 
this study is one of the first studies that examined the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the going concern evaluation. Especially in emerging markets 
like Jordan. The contribution  of  this  study  can enhance our comprehension  
regarding  the  relevance  of  the agency  theory  in explaining  the  behaviour  of  
the  going  concern  evaluation  within  the context of the Jordanian business 
environment. It is also likely that the outcome of this study will reduce the literature gap 
between corporate governance and going concern evaluation. Further, this study also provides 
evidence of applying the same instrument in similar situations, especially in countries with 
emerging economies such as Jordan.  
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